By Kevin E. Noonan --
Albert Einstein once famously (albeit perhaps apocryphally) said that "[c]ompound interest is the most powerful force in the universe." Not to contradict the creator of 20th Century physics, but it is just as likely that the most powerful force in the universe is the power of unintended consequences. The Federal Circuit illustrated this power in its recent decision in iNo Therapeutics LLC v. Praxair Distribution Inc. with regard to Justice Breyer's exhortation, in his Mayo Collaborative Serv. Inc. v. Prometheus Laboratories opinion, regarding the need to beware of "interpreting patent statutes in ways that make patent eligibility 'depend simply on the draftsman's art' without reference to the 'principles underlying the prohibition against patents for [natural laws],'" citing Flook v. Parker.
Plaintiffs iNO Therapeutics, LLC, Mallinckrodt Hospital Products Inc., and Mallinckrodt Hospital Products IP Inc. asserted U.S. Patent Nos. 8,282,966; 8,293,284; 8,795,741; 8,431,163; and 8,846,112, which the opinion "collectively [termed the] 'heart failure patents' or 'HF patents'" against Praxair Distribution Inc. and Praxair Inc. Plaintiffs also asserted U.S. Patent Nos. 8,573,209; 8,776,794; 8,776,795; 9,265,911; and 9,295,802 which the opinion "collectively [termed the] 'delivery system infrared patents' or 'DSIR patents'" and which were directed to devices for administering nitric oxide gas. As explained in the opinion, inhaled nitric oxide (iNO) gas had been "used to treat infants experiencing hypoxic respiratory failure" since at least the early 1990's. However, in certain cases this treatment results in increased pulmonary edema for infants having a congenital defect, left ventricular hypertrophy. The patents-in-suit were directed to methods and a gas delivery device to ameliorate this side-effect, as exemplified by the following claims:
The '741 patent:
1. A method of treating patients who are candidates for inhaled nitric oxide treatment, which method reduces the risk that inhalation of nitric oxide gas will induce an increase in pulmonary capillary wedge pressure (PCWP) leading to pulmonary edema in neonatal patients with hypoxic respiratory failure, the method comprising:
(a) identifying a plurality of term or near-term neonatal patients who have hypoxic respiratory failure and are candidates for 20 ppm inhaled nitric oxide treatment;
(b) determining that a first patient of the plurality does not have left ventricular dysfunction;
(c) determining that a second patient of the plurality has left ventricular dysfunction, so is at particular risk of increased PCWP leading to pulmonary edema upon treatment with inhaled nitric oxide;
(d) administering 20 ppm inhaled nitric oxide treatment to the first patient; and
(e) excluding the second patient from treatment with inhaled nitric oxide, based on the determination that the second patient has left ventricular dysfunction, so is at particular risk of increased PCWP leading to pulmonary edema upon treatment with inhaled nitric oxide.
The '794 patent:
1. A gas delivery device comprising:
a gas source to provide therapy gas comprising nitric oxide;
a valve attachable to the gas source, the valve including an inlet and an outlet in fluid communication and a valve actuator to open or close the valve to allow the gas through the valve to a control module that delivers the therapy gas comprising nitric oxide in an amount effective to treat or prevent hypoxic respiratory failure; and
a circuit including:
a memory to store gas data comprising one or more of gas identification, gas expiration date and gas concentration; and
a processor and a transceiver in communication with the memory to send and receive signals to communicate the gas data to the control module that controls gas delivery to a subject and to verify one or more of the gas identification, the gas concentration and that the gas is not expired.
(where the italicized limitations are relevant to the Court's decision). The opinion also notes that the Court had earlier affirmed the PTAB's invalidation of the '112 patent in inter partes review (see "Praxair Distribution, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Hospital Products IP Ltd. (Fed. Cir. 2018)").
The District Court held the claims of the HF patents to be directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and that Praxair did not infringe the claims of the DSIR patents. Mallinckrodt appealed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and remanded, in an opinion by Chief Judge Prost joined by Judge Dyk; Judge Newman concurred in part and dissented in part (but the thrust of her opinion dissented from the majority's routine and now conventional, but not capable of being well-understood, affirmance that the claims were not eligible for patenting under § 101). The Court applied its now well-worn (and unnecessarily expansive) interpretation of the Supreme Court's Mayo/Alice test in affirming the District Court. Dissecting the claims in furtherance of its patent-invalidating efforts, the panel majority first states that:
It is undisputed that treatment of infants experiencing hypoxic respiratory failure with iNO gas has existed for decades. The inventors observed an adverse event that iNO gas causes for certain patients. The patent claim does no more than add an instruction to withhold iNO treatment from the identified patients; it does not recite giving any affirmative treatment for the iNO-excluded group, and so it covers a method in which, for the iNO-excluded patients, the body's natural processes are simply allowed to take place. Consequently, the claim here is directed to the natural phenomenon. The claim, apart from the natural phenomenon itself, involves only well-understood, routine, and conventional steps. For the reasons below, claim 1 of the '741 patent fails to recite eligible subject matter.
What follows is the majority's justification for this conclusion. The natural phenomenon is "undisputed" (because the majority defines it as such), the majority saying "[a] neonate patient's body will react to iNO gas in a certain way depending on whether or not the patient has a congenital heart condition called LVD," followed by a recitation of the consequences thereof. The panel majority then parsed the claim language to find that the claims are "directed to" an observation of the natural phenomenon they have defined, because the exclusion (from treatment) step "merely restates the natural law" (nature it seems providing a caregiver who can give the gas as well as knowing without benefit of the invention when to refrain from giving it). According to the majority:
Properly understood, this added step [characterized by Mallinckrodt as an "exclusion" step] is simply an instruction not to act. In effect, the claim is directed to detecting the presence of LVD in a patient and then doing nothing but leaving the natural processes taking place in the body alone for the group of LVD patients. Accordingly, the claim is directed to the natural phenomenon.
And to avoid any correspondence with Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals International Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018), the majority asserted:
Indeed, Mallinckrodt cannot dispute that the patented method does not propose a new way of treating LVD patients that leverages this discovery (e.g., by titrating the iNO dose). Instead, the claim simply requires that the patient not be treated with iNO. This is significant because a claim not to treat—i.e., not to disturb these naturally-occurring physiological processes within the LVD patient's body—risks monopolizing the natural processes themselves.
And returning to the opinion's theme:
A closer look at the claim language as a whole confirms that the focus of the invention is not on a new way of actually treating the underlying condition of hypoxic respiratory failure. Nor does it recite a way of reducing the risk of pulmonary edema while providing some level of treatment to those patients. Rather, the focus of the invention is screening for a particular adverse condition that, once identified, requires iNO treatment be withheld. A treatment step of administering a prior art dosage is also present. But that step is plainly not the focus of the claimed invention. Mallinckrodt concedes this step is not innovative. Mallinckrodt does not point to "any innovation other than its [purported] discovery of the natural law," citing Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC, 915 F.3d 743, 750 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
The opinion also cites Nat. Alternatives Int'l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2019), and Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 919 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019), in support of the majority's distinction between these claims and what it considers "method of treatment" claims. The panel further distinguished these claims from the patent-eligible claims in Rapid Litigation Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (a decision also written by the Chief), again on the grounds of "a careful reading of the claim language" in those claims and these.
With regard to the second step of the Mayo/Alice test, the panel majority rejected Mallinckrodt's argument that the claims possess an "inventive concept." Following their wont, the majority found nothing sufficiently novel to warrant satisfaction of the second step inquiry. It is a tribute to the essential blurring of statutory lines engendered by Justice Breyer's Mayo decision (but much less understandable or forgivable when the nation's "patent court" does so) that the discussion revolves expressly on lack of novelty in performing the eligibility analysis ("This would be quite a different case if the inventors had invented a new way of titrating the dose" and, citing the District Court (which doesn't take a putatively specialized appellate court to do), "Plaintiffs cannot seriously contend that it is a new practice to exclude certain patients from treatment with a drug when those patients are at an increased risk of experiencing negative side effects from the drug"). Understandably, the majority took frank recourse to what they perceive to be the parallels between these claims and the claims in Mayo to support their decision. And the majority characterized as a "red herring" Mallinckrodt's contentions that their claims do not entirely preempt the putative natural phenomenon, surprising in view of the role preemption plays in justifying the Supreme Court's eligibility requirements in the first place.
The majority's consideration of infringement of the DSIR patents is more legally conventional, involving Mallinckrodt's disagreement with the District Court's construction of the term "verify" in the phrase "verify one or more of the gas identification, the gas concentration and that the gas is not expired." The majority correctly noted that the District Court didn't formally construe the word, giving it its plain and ordinary meaning. The opinion characterizes this argument as Mallinckrodt "attempt[ing] to undo its loss on infringement by redrawing the metes and bounds of the claim" and finds this effort "unavailing."
Providing one basis for Judge Newman to agree with her colleagues, the opinion reversed a "technical error" by the District Court and remanded for correction of the Court's "clerical error" (specifically, issuing a "blanket" judgment on all the claims of the asserted patents rather than limiting it to the asserted claims).
Judge Newman's dissent is directed to the eligibility portion of the decision. In her view, the inventors observed a natural phenomenon and then developed a treatment method that took advantage of that observation to avoid adverse events. "The method that is described and claimed does not exist in nature; it was designed by and is administered by humans" in her view. Procedurally, Judge Newman faults her colleagues because:
The majority improperly separates the claims into old and new steps, describes some claim steps as a "natural phenomenon" and some steps as "well-understood, routine, and conventional steps," and avoids the requirement that a claimed invention is considered as a whole.
And "[t]oday's change of law adds to the inconsistency and unpredictability of this area of patent-supported innovation." In Judge Newman's view "the majority's ruling conflicts with extensive precedent" (which she extensively cites) as well as "the national interest":
The majority [states that] "we emphasize the narrowness of our holding today, which is limited to the particular claims at issue and is driven by the particular circumstances here." This disclaimer appears at the end of a lengthy exposition, whose wide-ranging pronouncements of law and policy are not tied to narrow circumstances or claims. The persistent theme of the majority's analysis is that if a claim contains limitations that concern human physiology, ineligibility arises under section 101, whether or not the claimed method of medical treatment meets the requirement of patentability.
The majority's broad pronouncement of ineligibility of medical treatment that relates to human physiology not only contravenes precedent, but contravenes the national interest in achieving new methods of medical treatment with the assistance of the patent incentive.
Reaching back more than two centuries, Judge Newman reminds her colleagues that patents do not function to "impede scientific and technologic advance," citing Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813), based on common law and statutory research exemptions, citing her dissent in Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and Giles Sutherland Rich in Principles of Patentability, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 393, 400 (1960) ("It should never be forgotten that patented inventions are published and become a part of the technical literature. This publication itself promotes progress in the useful arts and it is the prospect of patent rights which induces disclosure and the issuance of the patent which makes it available.")
Returning to the majority's blessedly non-precedential opinion, it will bring cold comfort to patent-divested patentees, as well as being somewhat ironic that the upshot of the opinion leads patent prosecutors to the inevitable conclusion that the Federal Circuit is counseling exactly what Justice Breyer cautioned against in Mayo, that we should beware of the clever draftsman who attempts (or worse, succeeds) in obtaining claims that are enforceable and pass the patent eligibility test that the Federal Circuit has crafted, based predominantly on such claim-drafting cleverness. This is not the first time that this has been the outcome of the Federal Circuit's patent eligibility jurisprudence. For example, in In re Roslyn, Judge Dyk's opinion held patent-ineligible claims to Dolly the sheep which was, after all, just a sheep (notwithstanding being a sheep unlike any sheep that had ever lived). But a careful review of that opinion leads ineluctably to the conclusion that, had the draftsman been clever enough (or prescient enough to realize before the fact the quantum and quality of cleverness required) to have claimed a flock of genetically identical sheep, the Court's objections to patent ineligibility would have perforce fallen, because it would be undeniable that flocks of genetically identical sheep do not occur in nature. This state of affairs is frankly Byzantine and antithetical to Congress's purpose (uniformity and predictability in U.S. patent law) for creating the Federal Circuit, as well as being contrary to the principles of clarity and the creation of "bright line rules" that arguably prompted the Supreme Court to begin its heightened scrutiny of the Court and its opinions (if not philosophy). The Federal Circuit's current path is contrary to the idea that patent claims should be readily understandable to well-intended business people and frank (or in current parlance, "efficient") infringers alike and also contrary to the Founders' attitudes regarding patenting as a way to encourage disclosure of new inventions for the public good. Having such a path will give little relief to those who have lost patent rights under the current regime, but at least it provides a way for inventors to obtain patent-eligible claims no matter what other branches of government do in addressing this issue. Innovation, especially in the diagnostic and life sciences arts, requires no more and is entitled to no less.
iNO Therapeutics LLC v. Praxair Distribution Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2019)
Nonprecedential disposition
Panel: Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Newman and Dyk
Opinion by Chief Judge Prost; opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by Circuit Judge Newman
The phrase:
"the majority saying "[a] neonate patient's body will react to iNO gas in a certain way depending on whether or not the patient has a congenital heart condition called LVD," followed by a recitation of the consequences thereof."
may be used against any (and all) pharma patents.
The extension of the logic of "well, that's just the body following a natural law" EVISCERATES the foundation of the utility of any (and all) pharma.
May the "law of unintended consequences" be called a "law of nature?"
Posted by: Skeptical | September 04, 2019 at 09:35 AM
Thanks for reporting this, Kevin. With that panel, this outcome - and the way it was reached - was a foregone conclusion. Evidently Prost and Dyk think that medical advances will just occur on their own.
And when I see a case like this, I can't help but be a little irritated at Judge Rader. A single lapse in judgment on his part led to abdication of the CJ position and then shortly thereafter his position on the court altogether. Had he been on this panel instead of Dyk or Prost, it's clear the claims would have passed 101, as they should have. But then, had he stayed CJ in 2014, much of today's Alice/Myriad/Mayo mess might not exist.
Posted by: Atari Man | September 04, 2019 at 12:57 PM
Atari Man,
I have to disagree on the view of how history may have unfolded - remember if you will, that Rader WAS ALREADY at his "wits end" with the CAFC at the Alice en banc stage (read again his musings therein).
The CAFC is rudderless; or up a creek without paddles -- feel free to choose your analogy.
Posted by: Skeptical | September 05, 2019 at 07:13 AM