By Andrew Williams --
Can any petitioner appeal a Board's final written decision from an inter partes review or post grant review proceeding? Contrary to the language of 35 U.S.C. § 141(c) which permits any party "who is dissatisfied with" the Board's decision to appeal the case to the Federal Circuit, most practitioners believed that the Federal Circuit's decision in Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research dictated that Article III standing was still a requirement for IPRs and PGRs. However, the Court left a potential loophole in the Consumer Watchdog case when it acknowledged that it was not deciding "whether, under other circumstances, the preclusive effect of the estoppel provisions could constitute an injury in fact." In the IPR context, 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) prevents a petitioner from requesting or maintaining any proceeding before the Office or asserting in a civil action or before the ITC the invalidity of any claim on a ground that the petitioner "raised or reasonably could have raised," if the claim was subject to a final written decision (subject, of course, to the interpretation of this statute by the Federal Circuit). Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit earlier today decided that standing is still required for a petitioner to appeal an adverse final written decision from the Board. Moreover, in Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc., the Court did not find any distinction in the estoppel effects of the two different proceedings, because the petitioner/appellant was "not engaged in any activity that would give rise to a possible infringement suit."
The Federal Circuit recognized in the Phigenix opinion that since its inception nearly thirty-five years ago, it has never "established the legal standard for demonstrating standing in an appeal from a final agency action." The three elements that make up the standing requirement are "(1) [that the party has] suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the [party], (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Phigenix (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). However, when Congress provides a party with a procedural right to appeal an administrative decision, the immediacy and redressability requirements may be relaxed. See Phigenix, FN 2 and Consumer Watchdog. Nevertheless, the obligation to establish an injury in fact remains firm. See id.
In order to demonstrate standing to appeal a decision from final agency action, the Federal Circuit addressed three considerations. First, the appellant has the burden of production to establish standing, not unlike a party that moves for summary judgement in district court. Second, the appellant must use evidence "to the extent necessary to explain and substantiate its entitlement to judicial review." Sometimes standing can be self-evident, such as when the appellant is an object of the action. Otherwise, it must submit "'arguments and any affidavits or other evidence," which can be record evidence from the agency action or any additional evidence submitted to the Court. Finally, an appellant must produce this evidence at the first appropriate time, which can either by "in response to a motion to dismiss or in the opening brief."
In the present case, the patent holder was ImmunoGen, Inc., and the patent at issue was U.S. Patent No. 8,337,856, which relates generally to huMab4D5 ANTI-ErbB2 antibody-maytansinoid conjugates. ImmunoGen had licensed the '856 patent to Genentech Inc. because it purportedly covers the use of the drug Kadcyla®. Phigenix is a third-party for-profit "research company that focuses 'on the use of novel molecular therapeutics' designed to fight cancer." It had developed a patent portfolio that included U.S. Patent No. 8,080,534, which Phigenix alleged covers Genentech's activities related to Kadcyla. In fact, a case is currently pending in the Northern District of California in which Phigenix has asserted the '534 patent against Genentech. Phigenix claimed that it filed the current IPR petition "[t]o further its commercialization efforts with respect to its patent portfolio." The PTAB subsequently found the claims nonobvious, thereby prompting this appeal.
The Court first applied the operative standards that it had identified to the question of Phigenix's standing. In doing so, the Federal Circuit noted that Phigenix was not asserting that it faced a risk of infringing the patent, that it was a potential licensee of the patent, or that it would otherwise take any action that implicated the patent. Instead, Phigenix was contending that it had suffered "actual economic injury" because the mere existence of the patent increased competition between itself and ImmunoGen, which Phigenix alleged was a cognizable Article III injury. Specifically, it alleged that at least of portion of the licensing revenue that ImmunoGen was enjoying would inure to Phigenix if the patent were invalidated.
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit found that Phigenix had failed to substantiate these assertions with evidence. These arguments were not developed at the PTAB, so there was no record evidence that Phigenix could cite. Instead, it resorted to submitting at least one declaration and a "non-record" document. The problem was that the declaration did not set out the requisite supporting facts, but instead included conclusions of law. In addition, the other document, an attorney letter sent to ImmunoGen, merely stated that Phigenix "believed" that it had a strong portfolio, and that it "believed" the '856 patent was invalid. The conclusory statements found in the declaration and the letter regarding a hypothetical licensing injury were insufficient to establish injury in fact. "However, there is simply no allegation here that Phigenix has ever licensed the '534 patent to anyone, much less that it licensed the '534 patent to entities that have obtained licenses to the ImmunoGen '856 patent."
So what can practitioners take away from this case? First, if you are a third-party petitioner that unsuccessfully challenged a patent before the PTAB, and you intend to rely on economic injury in fact to establish standing, you will need to present concrete evidence providing facts of that harm. Fortunately for such a petitioner, it's clear that you don't need to establish the necessary record during the IPR itself. Even though the presented evidence didn't succeed in this case, the Federal Circuit sanctioned the use of declarations and other evidence presented for the first time before the Court. This is good news, of course, because the ability to establish a record before the Board is severely limited, especially with the page and word count limits. Moreover, such evidence would unlikely be relevant to the assertions made in the petition.
Finally, from a policy point of view, this case could severely undermine the participation of parties unrelated to the challenged patents in IPR proceedings. Of course, biotech and pharmaceutical interest groups would like to see a "standing" requirement added to the IPR petitions themselves. But, without a change to the statute, anybody is still able to file a petition against any patent (provided they are not subject to the one-year time bar). Nevertheless, public interest groups, hedge funds, and operating companies without a cognizable injury will be unable to appeal an adverse decision. This is perhaps sufficient to deter at least some petitioners. With the prospect of no redress from a Board's decision, these parties may simply find that it is not worth the expense. On the other hand, this concern is only realized when the petitioner loses. With the levels of claim invalidation at the PTAB still high, this case probably won't deter as many petitioners as patent owners would like.
Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2016)
Panel: Circuit Judges Dyk, Wallcah, and Hughes
Opinion by Circuit Judge Wallach
Addressing Increased Drug Costs -- A Proposal
By Kevin E. Noonan --
As set forth in Jane S. Smith's 1990 book "Patenting the Sun: Polio and the Salk Vaccine," Dr. Salk operated under conditions that gave him the luxury of not having to worry about patents. One was the famous "March of Dimes" campaign of the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, which was created specifically to address polio by President Roosevelt (himself a polio sufferer) in 1938. The disease, virtually unheard of before the turn of the last century, created a popular panic wherein tens of thousands of children were incapacitated annually, and the grassroots efforts of the March of Dimes generated more than $200 million for research and patient care. Salk's work (as well as that of Albert Sabin on what would become the preferred form of the vaccine) was funded by March of Dimes money, circumstances very different from how science is funded today.
Other differences involve the regulatory environment and the costs such regulations impose on drug development. Of course, these regulations are also responsible for protecting (albeit sometimes imperfectly) the American public from ineffective or dangerous drugs, and so the societal costs need to be balanced with increased barriers to new vaccines and other drugs. But as Ms. Smith sets out, Dr. Salk was able to test early prototypes of his vaccine on children in a nearby institution caring for mental retardation, and the force of the fear regarding polio was such that the propriety of this testing was not questioned. Moreover, Salk did his work prior to the thalidomide tragedy that led to changes in FDA laws and regulations that greatly increased the stringency (and thus the cost) of obtaining approval. While a great deal of the cost of drug development can be laid at the feet of other aspects of this endeavor (the cumulative costs of many failed drugs for each successful one, for example), much of the increased costs of bringing new drugs to market since Dr. Salk's day has to do with this increased (but societally desirable) regulatory burden.
But even in view of these realities, the basis for an increasing amount of political pressure on drug companies is higher drug costs, particularly (and ironically) for biologic drugs which have significant advantages in addressing otherwise intractable diseases and which can have a specificity unknown for conventional drugs. It is easy but incorrect to attribute these costs to patents, but it is equally unavailing to ignore the political power of the many memes relating to failures in American capitalism that permit these seeming cost imbalances to arise.
If the future appears to contain even more expensive drugs and a political backlash against them, then a clear-eyed assessment of that future can provide at least three alternatives. The first is that the drugs will exist but that their availability will be stratified, between those who will be able to afford them on their own (either out-of-pocket or through so-called "Cadillac" health insurance plans) or through government-sponsored programs for select groups (veterans, for example) and those (perhaps the majority of Americans) who will not. The second is that these drugs will not be developed in the U.S., due to changes in patent or regulatory law that provide disincentives to development (such as further erosion of patent eligibility by the Supreme Court or a reduction in market exclusivity for biologic drugs as sought after by the Obama Administration). Neither of these alternatives is palatable, socially or politically.
A third course that may have the ability to address the growing problem of unsustainable increases in drug pricing would be some sort of cost control (presumably by the Federal government, analogous to systems in place in Europe and elsewhere), but to be practical there would need to be an economic incentive for the biotech and pharmaceutical industry to acquiesce. One quid pro quo in this calculus would be a reversal in the current regime that the FDA imposes user fees on applicants for regulatory approval, and instead to have the government pay the costs of its regulatory requirements. There is precedent in the negotiations leading to passage of the "Obamacare" healthcare overhaul to have government and the pharmaceutical industry come to an agreement over new ways to reduce healthcare costs. Such a tradeoff could reduce a significant proportion of the costs of new drug development and thus eliminate the economic pressure for legitimate recompense that is likely not economically sustainable (see, e.g., Picchi, "The cost of Biogen's new drug: $750,000 per patient"). And it might also attenuate the FDA's requirements for approval, wherein the agency as a Federal bureaucracy might have incentives to balance its mandate to ensure safety and efficacy of approved drugs with the realities of drug development, to make both more realistic.
But it is clear that something must be done, if only to ensure that our ability to produce more effective drugs does not founder on soundbite-driven, simplistic solutions to the problems of providing efficient incentives for doing so.
Posted at 10:05 PM in Media Commentary | Permalink | Comments (15)