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« Section 101 and the Growing Alice Backlash | Main | Intendis GmbH v. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Inc., USA (Fed. Cir. 2016) »

May 16, 2016


Although it probably would not have affected this outcome, the Fed. Cir. here seems to again be ignoring the longstanding Sup. Ct. requirement of Erie v. Tompkins et al to apply state contract law to general contact law issues? [Issues of product sales, employment agreements, assignments, etc.] [One of these days may we see a Sup. Ct. admonishment?]

P.S. Some cited expanded-follow-on Sup. Ct. cases re Erie v. Tompkins include Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) and Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).

Three puzzling items in a row, starting with the past thought of the article (offer for sale already existed, so there is NO expansion with this ruling), and then a double dip by Mr. Morgan who has Erie on the mind / this case has zero to do with Erie, as this was clearly a case of Federal patent law.

Re: "this case has zero to do with Erie, as this was clearly a case of Federal patent law."
There is no preemption or definition in patent law of what kind of contractual arrangement constitutes an "on sale" bar. Furthermore, the Sup. Ct. gave it a standard commercial definition, overruling prior Fed. Cir. decisions.
Not every legal issue that arises in patent cases is entitled to special definitions unique to patent cases, nor did the Fed. Cir. even argue for that in this case.

Mr. Morgan - the "on sale" bar is part and parcel of the Federal law of 102.

What the Supreme Court does is very much part of the problem with the Federal (statutory) law - maybe you should try harder to be aware of that.

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